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Informal Partnerships: Their Status
Under Federal and State Tax Law
I. INTRODUCTION
An examination of the definition of a partnership for federal in-
come tax purposes quickly reveals a disparity between the federal
tax law definition of a partnership and state law definitions.' This
disparity is a result of the different purposes of Subchapter K of
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and the Uniform Partnership
Act (UPA). The rules of Subchapter K of the Code are grounded
on certain fundamental income tax principles, while the UPA fo-
cuses to a large extent upon the definition of the legal relations and
rights among partners.2 This divergence of purpose produced a
1. The definition of partnership for federal tax purposes is discussed in § I of
text infra. State law definitions of partnership under the Uniform Partner-
ship Act [hereinafter cited as UPA], particularly the Nebraska enactment of
the Uniform Partnership Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-301 to -343 (Reissue 1976),
are discussed in § III of text infra.
2. Doll, Partnership Taxation and State Partnership Laws: A Checklist of
Problems, 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 789, 789-90 (1962); Sullivan, Conflicts Be-
tween State Partnership Laws and the Internal Revenue Code (First Install-
ment), 15 TAX. L. REv. 105, 106-08 (1959).
Sullivan lists the fundamental income tax principles upon which the rules
of Subchapter K are grounded:
Income should be taxed to the person who earned it. [Lucas v. Earl,
281 U.S. 111 (1930) ] Income derived from property is to be attributed
to the owner thereof. [Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940)] The
power to dispose is the equivalent of ownership. [Id.] An elemental
requirement of a tax system is production of revenue payable to the
Government at regular intervals. [Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,
282 U.S. 359 (1931) ] Profits and losses from the operation of a busi-
ness are to be treated as ordinary income, and the definition of capi-
tal assets must be narrowly applied to prevent the conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain. [Corn Products Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955)]
Sullivan, supra, at 108.
Sullivan also points out that the UPA sought to develop a set of rules
within which partnerships could satisfactorily operate. His conclusion is
based on the observation that more attention was devoted to the legal rela-
tions and rights of among partners than to any other phase of partnership
activity, and within that area the activities and procedures connected with
the severance of partnership relations received more attention than any
other subject. Id. at 106.
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federal tax definition of "partnership" that is broader than state
law definitions.3 Thus, some groups or arrangements will be con-
sidered partnerships for federal tax purposes while they are
clearly not partnerships under state law. Informal arrangements
between parties that are partnerships for federal tax purposes are
not so clearly non-partnerships under state law. Informal partner-
ships involving small farming operations often fall within this gray
area. Typical of these types of arrangements are father-son or
brother-brother operations in which the parties own separate par-
cels of farmland, pooling their resources and farming the parcels
together while splitting the income and expenses. Despite the fre-
quency of these informal types of arrangements, surprisingly little
has been said or written concerning their state versus federal law
status. This comment examines the federal and state law classifi-
cations of such arrangements and the effect that federal tax laws
may have upon parties not desiring partnership status for pur-
poses of state law.
II. PARTNERSHIP FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES
Partnership classification for federal tax purposes can have sig-
nificant consequences for the parties involved. In some instances,
partnership classification results in nonrecognition treatment for
current (i.e., nonliquidating) distributions or exchanges of prop-
erty which would otherwise be treated as taxable sales or ex-
changes. 4 If an informal arrangement is classified as a partnership,
3. See § H of text infra.
4. If an informal partnership is not a partnership under federal tax law, gener-
ally an exchange of property for other property between the parties is treated
as a taxable sale or exchange, unless the exchange is a "like kind" exchange.
LR.C. § 1001. No gain or loss is recognized when business or investment prop-
erty is exchanged for property of "like kind." LR.C. § 1031. However, a like
kind exchange only occurs if the property is of the same nature or character.
"[T]he words 'like kind' have reference to the nature or character of the prop-
erty and not its grade or quality. One kind of class of property may not...
be exchanged for property of a different kind or class." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031 (a)-I (b) (1956). Thus, if a party exchanges a portion of his interest in
equipment for a portion of interest in real estate, a taxable exchange occurs.
Such an exchange is treated as if the interest in equipment was sold for the
fair market value of the real estate received. I.R.C. § 1001. On the other hand,
if the informal partnership is classified as a partnership under the federal tax
laws, such an exchange would be characterized as a current (i.e., nonliquidat-
ing) partnership distribution and no gain or loss would be recognized by the
parties or the partnership. Under LR.C. § 731(a), the recipient of a current
distribution generally recognizes neither gain nor loss. The sole exception to
this rule occurs when the distribution includes an amount of money in excess
of the distributee's basis in his or her partnership interest. The distributing




the presence of a written or oral partnership agreement can con-
trol important tax conclusions.5 The Code also provides that elec-
tions affecting computation of taxable income for a partnership
shall be made by the partnership.6 If the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) treats the informal arrangement as a partnership, some
elections made by the parties as individuals that must be made by
the partnership may be ineffective. 7 For example, elections made
5. The presence of provisions in the partnership agreement controls important
tax conclusions in five distinct instances provided by the Code:
1. The partners' distributive shares of taxable income or loss of the
partnership (§ 704(a)).
2. The partners' distributive shares of a particular class of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit, which may differ from shares of gen-
eral income or loss (§ 704(b)).
3. Special allocation to the partners of depreciation, depletion, or
gain or loss with respect to interests in property contributed by part-
ners (§ 704(c) (2)).
4. Allocation to the partners of depreciation, depletion, or gain or
loss with respect to undivided interests in property contributed by
the partners (§ 704(c) (3)).
5. Characterization of payments made to a retiring or deceased
partner as being for his interest in goodwill (§ 736(b) (2) (B)).
1 A. WxLIs, PARTNERSHIP TAXATON § 5.01, at 40 (2d ed. 1976). See, e.g., J.
O'BYlR'E, FARM INCOME TAX MANUAL § 909 (5th ed. 1977).
6. LR.C. § 703(b) reads:
(b) Elections of the Partnership-Any election affecting the computa-
tion of taxable income derived from a partnership shall be made by
the partnership, except that the election under section 901, relating
to taxes of foreign countries and possessions of the United States,
and any election under section 617 (relating to deduction and recap-
ture of certain mining exploration expenditures), under section
57(c) (relating to definition of net lease), or under section 163(d) (re-
lating to limitation on interest on investment indebtedness), shall be
made by each partner separately.
7. Elections that must be made by the partnership include:
(2) the method used in computing depreciation with respect to
partnership property;
(3) the election to amortize the costs of emergency facilities (§ 168)
and grain storage facilities (§ 169);
(4) the choice of inventory method;
(5) the election to reinvest condemnation proceeds in qualifying
property and thereby avoid the recognition of gain on condemnations
pursuant to § 1033;
(8) the election to deduct additional first year depreciation (§ 179);
(9) the election to defer cancellation-of-indebtedness income under
§ 108;
(10) the election to expense land-clearing costs under § 182;
(11) the election of a taxable year (§ 706(b)); and
(12) the election to report gain under the § 453 installment method
1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON, R. WHrrImE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PArRs 1 9.04, at 9-17 to -18 [hereinafter cited as MCKEE 1.
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by the individual parties with respect to property, such as the elec-
tion to capitalize interest and carrying charges 8 and the election to
reinvest the proceeds from involuntary conversions of property
without recognition of gain,9 would be ineffective. 10 Thus, for par-
ties entering into or already involved in informal arrangements,
their status under federal tax law can have significant tax conse-
quences as well as an effect on their state law status.1
A. "Partnership": The Statutory Definition
The term "partnership" is defined broadly for tax purposes and
may include groups not commonly called partnerships. The Code
states "the term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by
means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is car-
ried on, and which is not within the meaning of this title, a corpora-
tion or a trust or estate."1 2 The breadth of the definition is
emphasized by section 1.761-1 (a) of the regulations, which states
that the term "is broader in scope than the common law meaning
of partnership."'13 Yet, section 761 does not provide a clear test for
8. I.R.C. § 266.
9. I.R.C. § 1033.
10. 1 McKEE, supra note 7, 1 3.01[3].
11. This comment is primarily concerned with the effect partnership status may
have upon state law status. Thus, the tax consequences of federal partner-
ship status are not examined further. Since the federal tax definition is ex-
amined, the consequences of federal tax status and the importance of
determining the federal tax status is mentioned here.
12. I.R.C. § 761. LR.C. § 7701(2) defines partnership in an identical fashion.
13. The regulation reads:
(a) Partnership.-(1) In general. The term "partnership" includes a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organi-
zation through or by means of which any business, financial opera-
tion, or venture is carried on, and which is not a corporation or a trust
or estate within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The term "partnership" is broader in scope than the common law
meaning of partnership, and may include groups not commonly
called partnerships. See section 7701(a) (2). See regulations under
section 7701(a) (1), (2), and (3) for the description of those unincor-
porated organizations taxable as corporations or trusts. A joint un-
dertaking merely to share expenses is not a partnership. For
example, if two or more persons jointly construct a ditch merely to
drain surface water from their properties, they are not partners.
Mere coownership of property which is maintained, kept in repair,
and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership. For example,
if an individual owner, or tenants in common, of farm property lease
it to a farmer for a cash rental or a share of the crops, they do not
necessarily create a partnership thereby. Tenants in common, how-
ever, may be partners if they actively carry on a trade, business,
financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof. For ex-
ample, a partnership exists if coowners of an apartment building
1980]
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determining whether a partnership exists. On the contrary, it
states only that a partnership includes a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization, which is en-
gaged in a business, financial operation, or venture. Apparently,
under the section 761 definition, partnerships are jointly-owned,
profit-oriented arrangements that occupy the territory between the
more precisely defined joint ownership arrangements (i.e., corpo-
ration trusts and estates) and other profit-motivated arrangements
in which two or more participants have separate, rather than joint
financial interests. 14 In contrast to the rather well-defined bound-
ary between partnerships and the more precisely defined joint
ownership arrangements, the boundary between partnerships and
arrangements lacking sufficient jointness to be classified as part-
nerships has been described by one commentator as a "shifting no-
man's land."' 5 The problem of informal arrangements is determin-
ing whether the arrangement falls within this area.
B. Federal Law is Determinative
Long before the enactment of Subchapter K of the Code by
Congress in 1954, the Supreme Court had ruled that federal law,
rather than common law or state law, is controlling for issues in-
volving income taxes. In Hecht v. Malley 16 and Burk- Waggoner Oil
Association v. Hopkins17 the Court held that "Massachusetts
trusts" were associations within the meaning of the Revenue Act
of 1918 and therefore taxable as corporations despite the fact they
were partnerships under the state law of Texas and either pure
trusts or partnerships under the state law of Massachusetts.18
This logic also applies under Subchapter K. Thus, an arrangement
may be a partnership for federal tax purposes when it is not, and
could not be, one for state law purposes. For example, in Olmstead
Hotel v. Commissioner,'9 the court held that a state law trust cre-
ated by four married couples to operate a hotel was to be treated
as a partnership for tax purposes20 and a state law trust was also
lease space and in addition provide services to the occupants either
directly or through an agent.
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a)(1956). E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1960).
14. 1 McKEE, supra note 7, 3.02.
15. Id. The work also notes that "the intensely factual character of this aspect of
the partnership definition makes generalizations [concerning the boundary]
difficult." Id. 3.6.
16. 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
17. 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
18. Burk-Waggoner ORl Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1925); Hecht v. Mal-
ley, 265 U.S. 144, 161 (1924).
19. 11 T.C.M. (P-H) 52,209 (1952).
20. Id. at 697. The Commissioner had argued the trust was an association taxa-
ble as a corporation because the trust could survive the death of any owner
[Vol. 59:464
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held to be a partnership for federal tax purposes in Revenue Rul-
ing 64-220.21 Furthermore in Evans v. Commissioner,22 the court
held an assignment of a one-half partnership interest to a corpora-
tion effected termination of the partnership for tax purposes even
though the assignor remained a partner under state law, observing
that "for federal income tax purposes, Federal Tax law is control-
ling... and the legality, or lack of thereof, of a partnersh~ip -under
State law does not determine whether a partnership exists for fed-
eral tax purposes. ' 23 In Haley v. Commissioner,24 the court found
a partnership for tax purposes because the agreements and the
conduct of the parties indicated the existence of such a relation-
ship. The court found an intent to enter into it, despite the parties'
express statements in their agreements that they did not intend to
enter into a partnership or a joint venture.25
Moreover, a partnership under state law is not necessarily a
partnership for federal tax purposes. The Supreme Court in Con-
and the individuals' interests could be sold if certain conditions were met.
The court held the trust to be a partnership for tax purposes, relying on the
following factors: (1) personal liability of the members was unlimited; (2)
there was a lack of centralized management since all four male members par-
ticipated jointly in the operation and management of the business; and (3)
there was a lack of directors, officers, by-laws, minutes, a seal, or any such
customary characteristics of a corporation. Id. at 696-97.
21. Rev. Rul. 64-220, 1964-2 CB. 335. Under the terms of the trust agreement the
beneficiaries had the sole right to operate the trust property held by the trust
company as trustee for their joint profit. That operation was held to result in
a joint-venture or partnership for federal income tax purposes. Id. at 337.
See, e.g., Beulah H. Nichols, 32 T.C. 1322 (1959) (acq) (partnership for tax pur-
poses existed between physician and nonphysician wife who contributed
services and capital, even though such a partnership was illegal under state
law); Claire A. Ryza, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 269 (1977) (partnership existed be-
tween husband and wife operating an illegal abortion mill); Rev. Rul. 77-332,
1977-2 C.B. 484 (non-C.PA. principals in an accounting firm are partners for
tax purposes even though local law prohibits it).
22. 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971).
23. Id. at 550. (citations omitted). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (viii) (1956),
which provides "[a] minor child will be considered as competent... to enter
business dealings and otherwise to conduct his affairs on a basis of equality
with adult persons, notwithstanding legal disabilities of the minor under
State law."
24. 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953).
25. [N] either local law nor the expressed intent of the parties as to the
legal nature and effect of their written agreements are conclusive as
to the existence or non-existence of a partnership or joint venture for
federal tax purposes .... Substance rather than form controls in ap-
plying the federal tax statutes, and 'the realities of the taxpayer's ec-
onomic interest rather than the niceties of the conveyancer's art
should determine the power to tax.'
Id. at 818 (citations omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
316 U.S. 56, 58 n.1 (1942)).
19801
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missioner v. Tower 26 upheld the Tax Court's denial of partnership
status for a husband and wife for tax purposes even though their
partnership agreement would have been valid under Michigan law.
The Court's response to the respondent's contention that validity
under Michigan law should control with respect to validity for tax
purposes, was that it was not governed in its determination by how
Michigan law might treat the same circumstances for state law
purposes. "Michigan cannot, by its decisions and laws governing
questions over which it has final say, also decide issues of federal
tax law and thus hamper the effective enforcement of a valid fed-
eral tax levied against earned income." 27
Nevertheless, state law must be considered in analyzing these
relationships because it may be considered as a factor in determin-
ing whether a partnership exists for federal tax purposes. In Buck-
ley v. United States,2 8 the court relied upon the fact that a
partnership existed under Mississippi law in holding that a part-
nership existed for federal tax purposes. 2 9 Under Mississippi law,
a partnership did not need to be predicated upon a written agree-
ment, but could be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of
the parties. Thus, a state law partnership existed between a pro-
fessor of journalism and one of his former students with respect to
a newspaper publishing business they had purchased where there
was an oral agreement to share profits and the professor's conduct
evidenced intent to form a partnership. 30 The arrangement's state
law status was expressly considered by the court in making its de-
termination that a partnership also existed for tax purposes.
Status under state law has also been held to be determinative
with regard to the type or nature of the property interest held for
purposes of nonrecognition treatment for involuntary conversion
gains under section 1033. In M.H.S. Co.,3 ' the Tax Court deter-
26. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
27. Id. at 288. See also United States v. Kinter, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), where
the Service was arguing that an association of medical doctors was a partner-
ship for tax purposes because associations of doctors could not be corpora-
tions under state law. The court held that despite its state law status, the
association was taxable as a corporation: "Groups which could not engage in
certain activities under State law because of their particular structure, or
were considered partnerships have been recognized as legitimate 'associa-
tions' partaking of corporate character for taxing purposes under federal
law." Id. at 423.
28. 76-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9473 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
29. "Whether a partnership existed for federal tax purposes is to be determined
by federal law, although local law is relevant to such an analysis." Id. at
84,313. E.g., Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953).
30. The professor exercised managerial perogatives, negotiated financing for the
business and permitted the business to be represented to the community as a
partnership. 76-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9473, at 84,313.
31. 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 76,165 (1976), affd, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 59:464
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mined that under Tennessee law, a company's condemnation
award for real estate actually had been reinvested in a state law
partnership. Since under Tennessee law an interest acquired in a
partnership is an interest in personalty regardless of the fact that
the underlying assets of the partnership include interests in real
property, the Tax Court denied nonrecognition of gain under sec-
tion 1033 for lack of a "like kind" property exchange. 32 Thus, al-
though informal arrangements must look to federal law to
determine whether their arrangement is a partnership for tax pur-
poses, state law should not be disregarded in evaluating their tax
status and the tax treatment of various arrangements between the
parties involved.
C. "Partnership": The Federal Income Tax Definition
The Code does not attempt a specific definition of "partner-
ship. ' 33 Consequently, for a definition of partnership one must
look to case law. The landmark cases setting forth what consti-
tutes a partnership for federal income tax purposes are Commis-
sioner v. Tower,3 4 and Commissioner v. Culbertson.35 In Tower,3 6
the Supreme Court upheld the Tax Court's conclusion that the
existence of a partnership had not been established. In its deci-
sion, the Court stated a definition of partnership for income tax
purposes:
A partnership is generally said to be created when persons join together
their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade,
profession, or business and when there is community of interest in the
profits and losses. When the existence of an alleged partnership agree-
ment is challenged by outsiders, the question arises whether the partners
really and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on
business and sharing in the profits or losses or both. And their intention
in this respect is, question of fact, to be determined from testimony dis-
closed by their 'agreement, considered as a whole, and by their conduct in
execution of its provisions.
3 7
The Tower decision has been interpreted as establishing cer-
tain specific criteria for determining whether a partnership ex-
ists.38 However, the Supreme Court in Culbertson3 9 rejected the
32. Id. at 744-46.
33. See § Il-A of text supra.
34. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
35. 337 U.S. 733 (1949). Both Culbertson and Tower are family partnership cases.
While family partnership cases present some problems not present in arm's
length partnerships, the general principles set out in Culbertson and Tower
apply to all partnership situations.
36. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
37. Id. at 286-87 (quoting Drennan v. London Assurance Co., 113 U.S. 51, 56
(1885)).
38. 1 McKEE, supra note 7, 1 3.02 n.12.
39. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
1980]
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idea that partnerships are defined by reference to any specific fac-
tors.
The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a part-
ner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard suppos-
edly established by the Tower case, but whether, considering all the facts
. .. the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended
to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise.4 0
Thus, the fundamental question since Culbertson in determin-
ing the existence of a partnership for tax purposes has been the
intent of the parties.4 1 This intent test focuses, however, on the
intention to carry on a business or venture for joint economic gain,
rather than the intention to be treated as a partnership for state
law or tax purposes.42 Determination of this intent requires an ex-
amination of all the surrounding circumstances. Culbertson and
later court decisions have listed the following factors as evidencing
that intent: (1) the agreement of the parties and their conduct in
executing its terms. (2) a purpose of carrying on a trade or busi-
ness; (3) the contribution of capital or services which each party
made to the enterprise; (4) the parties' control over income and
capital and their right to make withdrawals; (5) Whether each
party was a principal and coproprietor, sharing a mutual proprie-
tary interest in the net profits and having an obligation to share
losses; (6) whether the parties exercised mutual control and as-
sumed mutual responsibilities for the enterprise; (7) whether sep-
arate books of account were kept for the enterprise; (8) whether
business was conducted in the joint names of the parties and how
title to business property was held; and (9) the parties' indications
40. Id. at 742 (footnote omitted). According to the Court, the facts which should
be considered include:
the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provi-
sions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the
relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital con-
tributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it
is used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent ....
Id.
41. William N. Gurtman, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (1975). Gurtman involved the is-
sue of whether the parties to a written agreement for the manufacture and
sale of tanks and boilers were in a joint venture recognizable for tax pur-
poses. In deciding the question, the court considered the same principles
which govern the question of partnership existence for tax purposes. Thus,
the fundamental issue was "whether the parties intended to, and did in fact,
join together for the accomplishment or conduct of an undertaking or enter-
prise." Id. at 480 (citing Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077 (1964); Commis-
sioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 741-42 (1949)). The court in its resolution of
that question, considered "all the facts and circumstances in light of the fac-
tors, none of which alone is determinative, bearing on the issue." Id. See,
e.g., Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
42. 1 McKEE, supra note 7, 3.02[1].
[Vol. 59:464
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to others that the enterprise is or is not a partnership. 43 Further
evidence of intent that may be taken into account by the courts
include: (1) a separate bank account; (2) an employer's identifica-
tion number; (3) registration of a ficticious name; and (4) whether
a federal partnership tax return is filed.44
No one factor is controlling, nor is the lack of any factor specifi-
cally determinative.4 5 Enterprises which possess all the character-
istics would clearly be partnerships for income tax purposes. The
problem is determining the tax status of arrangements that carry
only some evidence of intent. The resulting difficulty in ascertain-
ing the intent of the parties through application of the foregoing
indicia has led to considerable disparity in the opinions- of the
courts and the rulings of the Service.4 6 One commentator has ob-
served:
Despite the Supreme Court's indication in Culbertson that a partnership
is not defined by reference to any specific or set of factors, it seems that
three requisites must generally be satisfied if an enterprise is to be classi-
fied as a partnership for tax purposes.
(1) the enterprise must be formed for the purpose of producing prof-
its;
(2) the profits generated by the enterprise must be shared jointly by
two or more persons; and
(3) two or more of the persons sharing the profits must do so as pro-
prietors.
4 7
This approach may not be characteristic of the types used by most
courts and the Service in the ascertainment of the parties' intent,
but it is helpful as a starting point in determining whether a part-
nership exists for tax purposes.
The typical small farming operation involving father-son or
brother-brother will satisfy those three requisites since: (1) the
parties have pooled their resources in order to farm successfully;
(2) the parties split the profits from the farming operations; and
(3) their profit interests usually reflect their co-ownership of the
machinery and/or real estate involved in the farming operations.
In addition, the parties usually share expenses. Each of them con-
tributes substantial services to the farming operations, and each
has authority to make purchases for the operations. However,
when their arrangement is informal and they have not considered
themselves to be organized as a separate entity, several of the indi-
cia of partnership may be absent: (1) separate books of account
43. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C. 1067
(1964); Edward C. James, 16 T.C. 930 (1951), aF'dper curiam, 197 F.2d 813 (8th
Cir. 1963).
44. 1 A. Wu..us, supra note 5, at 5.
45. Boone v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.D. 1973).
46. See generally 1 A. Waus, supra note 5, at 5-10.
47. 1 McKEE, supra note 7, 1 3.02[2].
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have not been kept for the enterprise; (2) the operation has not
been conducted in their joint names; (3) they may not have been
holding themselves out to others as a partnership; (4) the enter-
prise generally does not have a separate bank account or an em-
ployer's identification number; and (5) federal partnership income
tax returns may not have been filed in the past. Consideration of
all the facts and circumstances of such operations reveals the par-
ties' intent under the Culbertson test to carry on a business for
joint economic gain. Thus, they are a partnership for tax purposes
regardless of their desires.
D. Informal Partnerships in Federal Estate Tax Cases
When the Culbertson intent test is applied to father-son or
brother-brother farming operations, the indicia of intent leads one
to the conclusion that they are a partnership for federal income tax
purposes. The inclusion of such arrangements within the breadth
of the federal tax law definition of partnership is clearly illustrated
by the cases in the federal estate tax area involving claims of infor-
mal partnerships between husbands and wives for the purpose of
equalizing their estates in order to reduce estate taxes.48 Despite
the fact that these informal partnership cases are estate tax cases
and the existence of the partnership is argued by the taxpayer
rather than the Service, they apply the same test and rationale as
the income tax cases for the purpose of determining the existence
of a partnership.
48. By equalizing the estates of the spouses, the surviving spouse has ownership
of approximately one-half of the couple's property and the estate of the de-
ceased member of the marital union is reduced or increased accordingly.
Equalization is designed to protect against the situation where the first
spouse to die holds a large majority of the "marital property" and, thus, a
large amount of estate tax is due at that time. When their estates are equal-
ized, the combined estate tax liability for both may be reduced because of the
graduated rates and oftentimes the estate tax on one-half of the property de-
ferred until the death of the surviving spouse.
Estate of Everett Otte, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972), is an example of such
an estate equalization case. Otte involved a husband and wife who had devel-
oped a substantial farming operation subsequent to their marriage. They had
bought the land together and held it as tenants by entirety. The wife, besides
being a housewife, had helped substantially in the farming operations. The
husband died and the wife was arguing that one-half of the personal and real
property was actually her own and should not be included in the decedent's
estate. Although the court never explicitly considered whether an informal
partnership had existed between the two, it held they had worked as a "hus-
band and wife" team and the wife had contributed an adequate and full con-
sideration in money and money's worth in the acquisition of her one-half
interest in all the real and personal property. Therefore, one-half of all the
real and personal property should not be included in her deceased husband's
estate, and the estate tax liability was reduced accordingly.
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In one such estate tax case, Craig v. United States,49 the wife
argued that only fifty percent of the personal property involved in
the family farming operation should have been included in her de-
ceased husband's estate. She contended that she was entitled to
have one-half of the personal property involved in the farming op-
eration treated as her own because she had been in partnership
with her husband. The court stated the critical issue was the Cul-
bertson intent test, "not whether the capital or services contrib-
uted by a partner are of a certain quality to meet some objective
standard but rather whether 'the parties in good faith and acting
with a business purpose intended to join together in the present
conduct of the enterprise.' "50 The court then found that the evi-
dence indicated the husband and wife had in fact pooled their capi-
tal and labors with the good faith intent to conduct a family
partnership in the establishment, operation, and growth of the
family farm. Thus, the wife was held entitled to have one-half of
the personal property treated as her own. In ascertaining the hus-
band and wife's intent, the court looked at the capital contribu-
tions of both parties, the division of labor, the contributions of both
parties in the operation of the farm, and the fact that all major de-
cisions of the business were decided on the basis of equal partici-
pation by both husband and wife throughout their marriage as
they built a sizeable and profitable operation from scratch. 51
A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. Neel,52
which upheld a trial court decision that an informal partnership
had existed between a wife and her deceased husband. The evi-
dence showed that shortly after their marriage, the couple had
pooled their money without express agreement, and thereafter
each had made substantial contributions of labor and services to
joint undertakings in farming, business, and the practice of law.
Once again the court applied the Culbertson intent test. Despite
the absence of an express agreement, the court found it could be
reasonably and fairly implied from the facts that the deceased and
his wife had agreed to contribute substantial services, to jointly
manage and carry on as partners, and to share equally in the prof-
its and losses. The court's response to the lack of an express
agreement was that it was not necessary to prove an express part-
nership agreement.53 Instead, the agreement could be implied
from their conduct.
In determining whether a husband and wife were bona fide business
49. 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978).
50. Id. at 381-82 (quoting Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949)).
51. 451 F. Supp. at 381.
52. 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956).
53. Id. at 400.
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partners with respect to tax liability, the absence of a formal agreement
and the failure to set up books as partners is not conclusive. Neither is it
essential that written articles of partnership be prepared and executed. A
partnership agreement may be oral and may result from the acts and con-
duct of the parties clearly manifesting an intention to engage in a bona
fide business partnership.
5 4
Since an informal partnership had existed between the wife and
her deceased husband, only one-half of the property standing in
the deceased's name as well as one-half of the joint bank accounts
were included in the decedent's gross estate.55
These family arrangements were scrutinized by the courts to
determine whether the parties really intended in good faith to join
together their money, labor and skill for the purpose of carrying on
a business as a bona fide partnership.5 6 Father-son and brother-
brother farming operations would also be subject to similar scru-
tiny in the income tax area. In light of the above cases it is appar-
ent that the typical father-son or brother-brother operation would
be determined a partnership for tax purposes under the federal
law.
III. PARTNERSHIPS UNDER STATE LAW
Under state law, a partner generally is liable for all torts com-
mitted and all contractual obligations incurred by his partners in
connection with the partnership business, 5 7 while a mere co-own-
er's liability for the torts and contractual obligations of another co-
owner is strictly limited.5 8 Since joint ownership does not neces-
sarily establish a partnership under state law,59 the parties in in-
formal arrangements such as father-son or brother-brother
farming arrangements may desire not to be partners for those rea-
sons. If this is their desire, their status as a partnership for federal
tax purposes does not necessarily mean that they are also a part-
nership under state law and their state law status should therefore
be closely examined.
A. The Determination of Partnership Existence
The state law definition of partnership is not as broad as the
federal tax definition. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a part-
nership as an association of two or more persons, to carry on as co-
54. Id. at 400.
55. Id. at 396.
56. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 289 (1946); United States v. Neel, 235
F.2d 395, 399 (10th Cir. 1956); Eckhard v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 547, 549 (10th
Cir. 1950).
57. UPA § 15; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-315 (Reissue 1976).
58. UPA § 7(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-307(2) (Reissue 1976).
59. UPA § 25(d); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-325(2) (d) (Reissue 1976).
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owners, a business for a profit.60 In its enactment of the Uniform
Partnership Act, Nebraska amended that definition to read: "A
partnership is an association of persons organized as a separate
entity to carry on a business for profit."61 Yet, no formal means
are necessary for two parties to create a partnership.62 Thus, in
determining whether a partnership exists under the UPA, the
courts will examine the facts of each case in the light of several
criteria.63 Although different jurisdictions vary on the criteria that
are to be used, most have referred to the following factors as es-
sential: profit sharing, loss sharing, intention to form a partner-
ship, right of control, and various types of community of interest.64
The only element which appears to be absolutely essential in the
determination is profit sharing.65 Section 7 of the UPA66 states
that profit sharing is prima facie evidence of partnership unless it
falls within some limited exceptions. 67 However, despite profit
sharing's high evidentiary status, it may be overcome by other evi-
dence showing that the parties intended no partnership.68
Nebraska case law has defined a partnership as "a contract of
60. UPA § 6(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-306(1) (Reissue 1976).
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-306 (Reissue 1976) (emphasis added).
62. UPA § 16; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-306 (Reissue 1976).
63. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Fetty, 148 W.Va. 275, 278, 134 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1964).
64. 1 S. ROWLEY, PARTNERSaiP 40, 163 (2d ed. 1960).
65. Id.
66. § 7 Rules for Determining the Existence of a Partnership-In determining
whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by section 16 persons who are not part-
ners as to each other are not partners as to third persons.(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties,
joint property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself
establish a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share
any profits made by the use of the property.(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a
partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or
common right or interest in any property from which the returns are
derived.
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business
is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no
such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in pay-
ment-
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord,
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased
partner,(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary
with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business
or other property by installments or otherwise.
UPA § 7; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-307 (Reissue 1976).
67. UPA § 7(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-307(4) (Reissue 1976).
68. E.g., Troy Grain & Fuel Co. v. Rolston, 227 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1950).
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two or more competent persons to place their money, effects, labor,
skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to
divide the profit or bear the loss in certain proportions. ' '69 Carlson
v. Peterson70 sets forth the test for determining the existence of a
partnership: "[t]he existence of a partnership depends upon the
agreement of the parties, and their intention is to be ascertained
from all the evidence and circumstances of a case."'' v The inten-
tion of the parties is important because Nebraska law defines a
partnership as a consensual relationship. The parties' intent can
be present in an express or implied agreement 72 but their agree-
ment need not be evidenced by a written contract.7 3 For instance,
in Baum v. McBride,7 4 the court held that a partnership existed
where the evidence showed two parties had entered into an oral
agreement to combine their assets and conduct a company on an
even partnership basis.
Other jurisdictions have held it is not necessary that the parties
have knowledge they have entered into a partnership when the in-
tent is implied.75 The Nebraska Supreme Court has not consid-
ered that question to date. However, the definition of partnership
in section 67-306 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes requires an as-
sociation of persons organized as a separate entity,7 6 and the cases
refer to partnerships as being consensual relationships. If an ex-
press intention exists between the parties not to be treated as a
partnership, implied intent to enter into a partnership should not
be so easily established, especially in view of the fact that the bur-
den of establishing the existence of a partnership is upon the party
asserting the relationship exists. 7 7
Assuming the parties to informal farming arrangements do not
want to be treated as a partnership, what would be the outcome of
a third party claiming that a partnership exists?
First, the parties in such arrangements often split profits, which
is prima facie evidence of a partnership. Second, many of the facts
and circumstances of their farming operations will usually indicate
an implied intent to operate as a partnership, even if they are una-
69. Peterson v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829, 834, 53 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1952); Baum v. Mc-
Bride, 143 Neb. 629, 630, 10 N.W.2d 477, 478 (1943); Waggoner v. First Nat'l
Bank, 43 Neb. 84, 94, 61 N.W. 112, 116 (1894).
70. 130 Neb. 806, 266 N.W. 608 (1936).
71. Id. at 812, 266 N.W. at 611 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Baum v. McBride, 143
Neb. 629, 10 N.W.2d 477 (1943).
72. Bramson v. Bramson, 4 Ill. App. 2d 249, 259, 124 N.E.2d 33, 38 (1955).
73. Id.
74. 143 Neb. 629, 10 N.W.2d 477 (1943).
75. Jenkins v. Harris, 19 Tenn. App. 113, 121, 83 S.W.2d 562, 567 (1935).
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-306 (Reissue 1976).
77. Peterson v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829, 835, 53 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1952).
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ware of that fact. In light of these facts, the major question would
be the effect of an express intention of the parties not to be a part-
nership for state law purposes, especially if the parties had drawn
up transactions to buttress that express intention. The fact they
have never intended to organize their operations as a separate en-
tity for the purpose of farming, and representations to third parties
that they are not a partnership are additional facts to be consid-
ered. It appears it is difficult for them to overcome a presumption
of partnership resulting from profit splitting and facts implying an
intent of partnership. Generally, the substance of an arrangement
will control over its form, thus if the parties do not want to be
treated as a partnership for state law purposes, the less partner-
ship-like the conduct of their farming operation appears, the more
likely an express intention not to operate as a partnership will be
upheld.
B. The Effect of Filing a Federal Partnership Tax Return
The filing of a partnership tax return by parties in informal ar-
rangements such as father-son or brother-brother farming arrange-
ments may have adverse consequences on a desire not to be
treated as a partnership under state law. Despite the fact that the
state law definition of partnership is not coextensive with the fed-
eral tax definition, the filing of a federal partnership tax return
might be considered by a state court as evidence of intent to be a
partnership, or as an admission that a partnership exists. For ex-
ample, in Falkner v. Falkner,78 the court affirmed the lower court's
finding that a partnership existed between a son, his father, and
his brother, even though they had dealt with each other in a casual
way and had not kept any records. The son brought the action
seeking one-third interest in certain lands and personal property,
and for an accounting out of the alleged partnership. In affirming
the lower court's determination that the alleged partnership did
exist and that the remaining funds should be divided equally be-
tween the parties, the court stated that the strongest evidence in
support of the decision was the fact that partnership tax returns
were filed for the years 1953 through 1965, which indicated some
intention that a partnership existed and the trial judge was enti-
tled to consider it as such.
The filing of partnership tax returns has also been considered
in determining whether a partnership existed under state law. In
Boxill v. Boxill,79 in determining that a partnership had existed
between a sister and brother in the operation of a rooming house,
78. 24 Mich. App. 633, 644, 180 N.W.2d 491, 497 (1970).
79. 201 Misc. 386, 111 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1952).
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the court found that the existence of a partnership as claimed by
the sister was indicated by ample and persuasive confirmatory evi-
dence even though the agreement between the parties was not in
writing.80 The court listed the execution of the lease for the room-
ing house by the sister and the brother, the contribution of the
money by the sister to take and furnish the premises, the sharing
of the profits and losses between them, and the filing of partner-
ship income tax returns81 as some of the persuasive confirmatory
evidence.
Because the federal tax law definition and the state law defini-
tion of partnership are not coextensive, the wisdom of considering
the filing of a federal partnership tax return as evidence of the
existence of a state law partnership is questionable. Not all courts
take such an approach. In Keller v. Keller,82 the court held the fact
that an income tax return had designated the deceased husband's
wife as a partner and had reflected distribution of partnership in-
come to her did not establish the existence of partnership, particu-
larly where there was evidence that the payment had been made
for tax reasons.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, as well as many other state
courts, has not stated in its decisions dealing with partnership
existence whether it will consider the filing of a federal partner-
ship tax return as evidence of partnership existence. The fact that
some states have done so places parties in informal arrangements
in a dilemma when their informal arrangement is a partnership for
federal tax purposes and they do not desire to be a partnership for
state law purposes. If the parties file a federal partnership tax re-
turn, the return may well result in evidence of the existence of the
state law partnership that they wish to avoid.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the dilemma that parties may be placed in by their
federal tax status and their intention under state law, a suggested
course of action would be to forego filing a partnership tax return
in spite of their partnership status for federal tax purposes. Ap-
parently, the Service allows small partnerships to abstain from
filing partnership returns as long as each partner files a detailed
statement of his share of partnership income and deductions with
his own return. In the committee report83 to section 211(a) of the
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id.
82. 4 M1. App. 3d 89, 280 N.E.2d 281 (1972).
83. S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6869.
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Revenue Act of 1978,84 the committee recognized such an exemp-
tion for small partnerships (those with ten or fewer partners) from
section 211(a)'s penalty for failure to fie a partnership return.85
Given the Service's apparent acquiesence, parties in such a di-
lemma should be able to abstain from filing partnership tax re-
turns, despite their federal tax status, as long as they accurately
reflect their income and deductions on their individual returns.
Their status as partnerships under the federal tax laws and the
benefits that may arise from that status should not be impugned
by their decision not to ifie partnership returns. Thus, the state
law status of such informal arrangements would not be affected by
their status under the broader federal tax definition, and the theo-
retical ill effects arising from the differences in the definitions of
partnership would not exist in a practical sense.
Dana V. Baker '79
84. REvENUE ACT OF 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 211(a), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978)
(amends I.R.C. § 6698 to include a penalty for failure to file a partnership tax
return).
85. The penalty will not be imposed if the partnership can show that
failure to fie a complete or timely return is due to reasonable cause.
The committee understands that small partnerships (those with 10
or fewer partners) often do not file partnership returns, but rather
each partner files a detailed statement of his share of partnership
income and deductions with his own return. Although these partner-
ships may technically be required to file partnership returns, the
committee believes that full reporting of the partnership income and
deductions by each partner is adequate and that it is reasonable not
to file a partnership return in this instance.
S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 106 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6869.
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